In addition to this week's blog, I also wish to call your attention to my first foray into podcasting. Wes Bertrand, (author, psychologist, and podcast host) had me join him as a co-host on Episode 75 of the
Complete Liberty Podcast. Wes describes the episode as discussing the evils of militaries, the psychology of identity, selfless statism, and recognizing truth.
You can download the show for free by clicking the following link to the
iTunes Store
or
You can listen online by
clicking here, or right-clicking to save the file to your computer.
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I appreciate the time and effort that Jay Jones put into his critique of my last post
“What’s In a Contract.” His response is found uninterrupted in the comments section of last week’s blog. I believe his criticism is largely in response to a combination of misunderstanding what I meant and misapplying the principles advocated by Murray Rothbard. For easy differentiation, Jay's writing will be in red throughout this post.
Although this may not seem to directly address the issue of the immorality of war, I believe it’s both related and relevant. I honestly think that the American military would be rendered impotent were it not for the forced labor of military personnel. Working at the Navy’s only boot camp, I regularly interact with individuals who wish to leave the military after experiencing it firsthand, but instead they are forced to continue to “train” against their will. Only days and weeks after joining the Navy, if given the opportunity, a significant percentage of those who signed “contracts” would undoubtedly leave after discovering the true nature of military “service.”
Considering that the vast majority of military personnel claim that they were lied to by their Recruiters, it would only make sense that after discovering these lies, they would not continue to work under the false pretenses under which those very “contracts” were signed. It’s only after weeks of indoctrination and de-individuation that such persons willingly continue to work or even reenlist.
This is why spreading the truth that the organization known as the Department of Defense uses slavery to carry out its wars is crucial to ending both war and involuntary servitude.
First, to rebut the claim that one cannot “transfer one’s self-ownership”. That begs the simple question: “Why can’t I?” The analogy of someone else animating your body is a false choice.The empirical fact that someone else cannot animate your body is not a false choice but incontrovertible evidence that one cannot transfer her or his self-ownership. An individual may choose to direct her behavior to fulfill the wishes or desires of someone else, but she is no less in control of her body and mind and, therefore, no less a self-owner because she does this. The reality is that no matter how many contracts you sign or oaths you swear, you cannot have any less ownership in yourself (i.e. control over your mind and body).
Entering into a contract, in any degree, doesn’t imply the loss of all bodily or cognitive function.
I fully agree, and this only serves to further answer the first question of why you can’t transfer your self-ownership.
But to assert that one person, for whatever reason would not be able to choose to limit their choice, freedom or any number of things that binding oneself to a contract inherently implies is a horribly misguided sentiment. If the price was right, who is to say that I should not enter into a bond that said I must not speak about one specific thing for a given time? I think that Dan would assert that this would be separation “from your right to internally control your body”. But why couldn’t I limit myself, for awhile, if I were to choose? To assert that I couldn’t would infringe on my personal liberty and invalidate most, if not all, contracts. .
I did not, nor do I, assert that a person should be prohibited from being able to “choose to limit their choice, freedom” etc. so long as these limitations are self-imposed and self-enforced. I believe it would be absolutely wrong to try and force you to speak about something if you decided to refrain from speaking about “one specific thing for a given time.” However, it would be equally wrong to try and force you to stop saying something no matter what you may have signed or to whom you may have promised that you wouldn’t do so.
As an individual Jay has the right to say, or not say, anything on his own property because exercising this ability does not constitute the initiation of force against anyone else. However, if Jay were to sign a piece of paper promising that he wouldn’t make certain statements for a given period of time, such a document should not be viewed as an enforceable contract. I’m not advocating that Jay should be prevented from signing such a piece of paper but rather that he could not justly be penalized for failing to fulfill his promise.
The reason the hypothetical “no speech contract” cannot be justly enforced is because it involves no transfer of property and, therefore, no implicit theft if not fulfilled. Jay is incapable of transferring his right to speak because it is an inherent part of his self-ownership. Even if he signs a “contract” swearing that he will not speak about something, there is no transfer of this aspect of his self-ownership to the “receiving party.” Ultimately, Jay’s ability to speak whatever he wishes is an unalienable right.
If the “receiving party” in Jay’s contract transfers property ($1) to him in exchange for his promised future action (silence), then such property can be rightly understood to have been transferred conditionally and not absolutely. Should Jay fail to make good on his word, it would be implicit theft for him to keep the $1. What would be wrong, would be for the “receiving party” to duct tape Jay’s mouth shut or to confine him to a cage because he started talking. It is obvious then that if there were no transfer of property to Jay it would also be wrong for him to be forced to maintain his silence.
To directly answer Jay’s question of why he couldn’t limit himself from speaking for a while if he so chose, I would say that he is certainly welcome to do so, and I never implied otherwise. My assertion is that it would be wrong for someone to initiate the use of force against him for failing to live up to his promise.
However, the hallmark of true libertarianism is the mixture of eisegetic views of fanciful writings, the inability to look two steps ahead as well as a widespread failure to apply theories to the real world. “True Libertarianism” works in a world where true libertarians are gods. Dan’s excerpt of Rothbard’s work falls in line with my assertion. He overlooks (because it doesn’t fit with his world view, I suspect) the actual cost of a contract. Rothbard may have had an ethical book published. I doubt he did well in econ though.
That Jay expressed his doubt that Rothbard “did well in econ,” is an unfortunate example of shoving one’s foot deep into one’s mouth. Until his death in 1995, Murray Rothbard was in fact the preeminent economist of the Austrian School. He held a doctorate in the Philosophy of Economics from Columbia and was a distinguished professor at the University of Nevada. In addition to publishing numerous books on economics, he helped found the world center for Austrian Economics (
Ludwig Von Mises Institute) as well as the scholarly journal “Review of Austrian Economics.” (
Wikipedia: Murray Rothbard)
As for Jay’s claims of failing to apply ideas to the real world, I find this to be in direct contradiction to my condemnation and call for change to the very real world situation in which I’m forced to labor on behalf of others because of a past promise.
Simply put, contracts have both a cost and a price. What Rothbard and Dan both look at is the price. However, the cost may be far more. While an entity may offer pay for a given period in exchange for any number of things (work, silence, sex, whatever) they make the assumption that whatever problem they were trying to fix, or gap they were trying to fill, will be taken care of for that set amount of time. Thus, they can shift resources elsewhere.
The flaw in the thinking here seems to be in the idea that “If I am basically being paid as I go, me breaking the contract is ok. No harm, no foul.” That’s simply not the case. Reneging on a contract causes a shift in resources, time and personnel that the contract was designed to avoid for a set amount of time. This is the de facto theft that Rothbard cannot see. If not for future assurances, why make contracts at all? Thus, if Dan were to break his contract, it would be implicit theft.
Again, Jay fails to address the exchange of property that is essential to any justifiably enforceable contract. The fact that the expectations of people in the military would go unmet if I were to fail to fulfill my promise of labor cannot in any way be seen as my possessing any property that justly belongs to people in the military. Even though I signed such a promise in writing, it does not change the lack of property involved.
Jay is correct that the military might experience losses as a result of having decided to “shift resources elsewhere.” However, any such losses are always a risk when making predictions about human behavior, and they would not equate to theft on my part. If you doubt this, tell me what property belonging to the military I would possess if I were to stop working for them.
The analogy of the baseball player vs. the military is another false choice. I have known Dan for as long as I can remember. I know him to be an intelligent person. I cannot accept the argument that he didn’t know what he was getting into. To do so would imply wholesale ignorance on his part. The same goes for the baseball star. He knows the consequences of his actions when he signs on the dotted line. Dan did as well (as have I 3 times). Consequences are inherently a part of a contract and they vary. Given one’s place in history, indentured servitude could be an excellent option. But the argument of whether the cost was paid up front or in installments is paper thin. If Dan were to have received a bonus, would his arguments really be framed differently? I think not.
Jay does not explain what he means by saying that the analogy of the baseball player and the military is a false choice, so I cannot address this claim.
I’m glad that Jay doesn’t accept the argument that I didn’t know what I was getting into by signing a piece of paper promising to work for the military. I’m the only person who can truly answer as to whether or not I understood, and yet I would not accept this argument either. The fact that I did understand what I was doing when I signed those papers is never something that I have contested, and therefore, I’m unsure why Jay highlighted this truth.
If Jay was pointing this out for the purpose of arguing that a consequence is justified so long as someone understands beforehand what the consequence will be, then I vehemently disagree. I knew when I signed those papers that if I failed to fulfill my promise others would claim justification for imprisoning me. At the time, I agreed with this, but that neither made it right at the time, nor does it justify the threat of such action now that I properly understand it as enslavement.
My overall argument that I am currently enslaved would not be framed differently had I received a bonus tied to a set number of years of work. However, such a bonus would equate to the transfer of property, and therefore, as with Jay and his $1 received in exchange for silence, I would rightly transfer back any property I had conditionally received.
Although these clarifications are important to a proper understanding of what rightly constitutes a contract, it is irrelevant to my current circumstances. Unfortunately, those people identified as the military believe that I can rightfully be forced to fulfill my promise despite the fact that there would not be any implicit theft of property on my part if I were allowed to quit.
Dan’s lack of concern about his future employment adds nothing to this debate; it only shows that others may, whether they agree or disagree with him, find him hirable. The same goes for the persistence of taxes or the military. It has nothing to do with the debate (although everything to do with the failure to apply theory to the world and looking past step two). Neither does using the rape example. That analogy simply preys on our culture’s view on prostitution and other mores. If in another time or place; people wouldn’t look so harshly on said example.
My addressing my future employment was not for the purpose of debate, but seeing as this is my blog, I added it because some readers inquired about my perspective on this issue, and I figured that others who know me would be interested as well. I remain unclear on what is meant by “looking past step two,” and I can only postulate that it is somehow an argument that the ends can justify the means. As for the rape example, it remains pertinent, regardless of the prevailing cultural views on sex because it addresses the central question of our debate: whether or not it’s right to force someone to keep a promise.
In conclusion, who is to say what I can or cannot chose to do or give up? This is the nature of contractual law. Both parties giving up something of value for something they happen to find more valuable. The clauses or timeframe of said contract have no bearing in this debate. Simply that, at the time of signing, both parties accepted the terms. For good or for bad Dan, I and most of you have done the same at some time. The fact that we gave up something whether it be money, goods, time or a combination means little. And to renege is theft on some level. However, the greatest litmus test is to turn the contract around and play devil’s advocate. And here is where Dan’s argument meets its greatest failure: One party is always cheated when the other doesn’t come through.Jay’s conclusion makes clear that he does not recognize the transfer of property as the key to understanding just contract. Without a transfer of property, as in the case of a promise, reneging cannot be theft because theft requires the possession of someone else’s just property. In cases where property has been conditionally transferred dependent on the fulfillment of some action, the property should be returned if the contract is not fulfilled. However, in no case, is force ever justified to make someone keep a promise. Nevertheless, this is the standard operating procedure for those comprising the “Department of Defense.”
Ultimately, Jay is correct in implying that, apart from initiating the use of force, nobody should be able to justifiably say what a person “can or cannot chose to do or give up.” If this is his belief, I wonder why he does not see the contradiction in then arguing that I should be forced to continue to labor for someone else? Is slavery not one of the worst examples of forcing someone else’s action?
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