Days 67-70 - What's In a Contract?

The most common reason given to invalidate my claim that I am currently a slave seems to be the fact that I do not deny having once signed a piece of paper that said I agreed to work for the "Navy" for 8 years (5 years "active," 3 "inactive"). If you were unaware, I publicly decried this tyranny in Days 60-64, which was a blog that included my rebuttal to the "Investigating Officer," a paper copy of which is also currently circulating among those who identify themselves as my "Chain of Command."

To argue that the manner in which I'm presently forced to labor under the threat of imprisonment is not slavery simply because I once signed a sheet of paper is to pretend that it is possible to transfer one's self-ownership (or at least, to rent it). It is an easily observable fact that, while alive, you cannot allow anyone else to animate your body and use it in place of you. Simply put, self-ownership is an absolutely inalienable right; you cannot be separated from your right to internally control your own body. Even in slavery then, a person cannot rightly be said to be the property of someone else, but only a forced laborer on that individual's behalf.

The question then becomes, can a person ever consent to being forced to labor? This is, of course, inherently contradictory because force is an action initiated against someone in the absence of consent. For example, a woman cannot consent to be raped, for then it would not be rape, but consensual sex. With this truth in mind, who would argue that if a woman were to sign a contract saying she would have sex with a man whenever he wanted for the next five years, that man would then be justified in having sex with her even after the woman began to protest and say that she no longer wanted to have sex with him? Who would defend the man saying, "Well, she voluntarily signed a contract. Therefore, it's consensual sex, and she has no grounds for complaint. After all, nobody forced her to sign the contract."

Hopefully nobody would make this argument, and yet this same logic has repeatedly been the rationale given to me for why it is right that I be forced to continue working for the organization known as the "United States Navy." What is different? For both the hypothetical woman and myself, we signed pieces of paper agreeing to engage in certain behavior at a future point in time. At a later point, we both no longer desire to perform the previously agreed to behavior. If the previous logic would not be applied to a woman who promised she would engage in sex, why then is the argument applied to me? How is it right for others to force me to act against my will? The principles involved are the same; the only difference is the promised action.

Additionally, I suspect that not only would the hypothetical man be generally condemned for forcing the woman to fulfill her "contract," but the very piece of paper that the woman signed would be considered invalid and barbaric, certainly not a binding contract. Why then are "enlistment contracts" considered to be anything different? They are surely nothing more than promises of future action, just as the hypothetical woman's contract was such a promise.

Whether or not such "contracts" involve the transfer of benefits to the individual making the promise of future labor is irrelevant. Ultimately, the reason such "contracts" are not valid is that no person can alienate her or his right of self-ownership in the present, let alone can they rightly contract to do so in the future.

I don't mean to imply that there are no such things as promises. I do mean to emphasize that it is most definitely wrong to initiate the use of force against people simply for breaking a promise. With these clarifications in mind, the natural question arises as to how one differentiates between a contract and a promise. The answer is based on whether or not there was an exchange of property.

A promise is a statement of intended future action; a contract involves a real-time exchange of property. In his book, Ethics of Liberty (available free online), Murray Rothbard makes the following critical specifications regarding the nature of contracts:

“Unfortunately, many libertarians devoted to the right to make contracts, hold the contract itself to be an absolute, and therefore maintain that any voluntary contract whatever must be legally enforceable in the free society. Their error is a failure to realize that the right to contract is strictly derivable from the right of private property, and therefore that the only enforceable contracts (i.e., those backed by the sanction of legal coercion) should be those where the failure of one party to abide by the contract implies the theft of property from the other party. In short, a contract should only be enforceable when the failure to fulfill it is an implicit theft of property. But this can only be true if we hold that validly enforceable contracts only exist where title to property has already been transferred, and therefore where the failure to abide by the contract means that the other party’s property is retained by the delinquent party, without the consent of the former (implicit theft). Hence, this proper libertarian theory of enforceable contracts has been termed the “title-transfer” theory of contracts.” (page 131)

From this, I believe that if I were to break my "contract" with the Navy (something I don’t intend to do), it would not result in the implicit theft of any property. The Navy has not given me bonuses, advanced pay, or any fringe benefits such as a car, or a vacation home in the Hamptons, which could rightly be considered property and understood to be in exchange for my agreed upon future labor.

Each month that I work, more money that was stolen from other people is deposited into my bank account. Make no mistake, this is not a voluntary exchange (either between myself or the people from whom the money is expropriated), but it does occur in the present. Hypothetically, if I were to fail in fulfilling my contract by no longer laboring or reporting for duty, there would not only be a lack of moral or ethical grounds for imprisonment, but there would also be no legitimate reason to attempt to extract any type of repayment for my failure.

As to the pragmatic question of how the "military" could continue to operate without enslaving people to it, that's easy: it couldn't, and so it would cease to exist. Thus would end yet another form of slavery, and liberty-loving people everywhere would undoubtedly cry, "Good riddance!" No other employer forces people to continue to work for them under the threat of imprisonment. In these other industries that don't force people to labor, one’s reputation becomes immensely more important. Going back to an analogy I've used in other blogs, if I were a baseball player who failed to live up to his contract, I would legitimately have to return any property that had already been transferred to me in exchange for my promised future labor. Worse, I would face the extremely forbidding prospect of trying to convince another ball team to extend me an offer that I really would keep this time.

As for my own future employment, I have little concern that I will fail to find work because of a tarnished reputation. Going forward, I'm confident that there are myriad individuals who will gladly exchange their property for my labor. These are the type of persons who are of such character that they acknowledge that it is definitely better not to persevere in wrongdoing, merely for the sake of keeping one’s word.

In conclusion, I did sign a piece of paper promising to work for those calling themselves the "Navy." But which is immoral: that I no longer want to live up to my word in this regard, or that those same people are threatening me with incarceration if I don't continue laboring for them?

*My role in the process of seeking discharge as a conscientious objector ended when I filed my rebuttal last week. From this point forward, I'm simply waiting for a decision as to whether or not my "request" will be granted. Given this new set of circumstances, I expect that there will be few, if any, progress reports to give until a decision is made.

In the meantime, I intend to cut back to posting only on a weekly basis. Hopefully, this reduction in quantity will result in higher quality content that more effectively dispels the deadly memes that justify war. Of course, if an urgent issue develops, I won't hesitate to keep you apprised via a midweek blog.

Thanks for reading, and please, keep questioning.

Daniel